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COMMENTS
school they attend. It is possible to suggest that the Supreme Court may view
this federal law in the same light as the New York Textbook Loan Law and
accordingly sustain its constitutionality.
HELEN M. KANEY

ACCORD AND SATISFACTION: CONDITIONAL TENDER BY CHECK
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Frequently, in commercial relations, a dispute arises as to the amount due
on an admittedly existing debt. Assume that A and B are engaged in the trading
of hay and that A has ordered five hundred bales at one dollar per bale. When
the hay arrives A discovers that there are only four hundred and fifty bales in the
shipment. Since A could have sold the missing fifty bales of hay at a profit of one
dollar per bale, he believes that one hundred dollars should be deducted from
his bill to B representing fifty dollars lost value of hay and fifty dollars lost
profit. B on the other hand reasons that only the cost of the missing hay-fifty
dollars-should be deducted from the purchase price. In an effort to compromise,
A subtracts seventy-five dollars from the debt and tenders a check marked
"payment in full." It is at this juncture that the legal problem, which this comment considers, arises.
A tender upon the condition of full payment is often made when there is
a dispute as to the exact amount owed. In order to avoid litigation, or a continuing conflict, the debtor may submit a check for more than the amount he
thinks he owes but for less than the creditor claims is due.
The hypothetical above assumes the good faith of the debtor, which is
certainly not always the case. In an effort to examine the problem from both
sides, suppose that all five hundred bales arrive as ordered. A is unable to sell
all of the hay and as a result fifty bales remain unsold. A then writes to B
and claims that he ordered only four hundred and fifty bales, and as a result
of the excess shipment the other fifty bales have spoiled and are useless. He
sends a check for four hundred and fifty dollars to B marked "payment in full"
in the hope of escaping payment of what he justly owes.
If the debtor is tendering more than he believes is due in order to compromise, he wants to be assured that the check will either be accepted in full
payment or returned. He fears that the creditor will take advantage of him by
cashing the check and merely applying it to reduce the debt; to guard against
this prospect, the debtor marks his check "payment in full."
Upon receiving a check from a debtor stating that it is in full payment,
the creditor is confronted with a difficult problem. Naturally, he would prefer
to cash the check and still preserve his right to sue for the balance that he
believes is due. There is a possibility, however, that when the creditor sues for
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the remainder of the debt the court will hold that the suit is barred because
at common law, the creditor's act of cashing the check was considered an acceptance of the compromise agreement-an accord and satisfaction-which
extinguished the creditor's right to sue on the original debt.1
This comment will briefly survey the law of accord and satisfaction prior
to the Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter cited UCC or Code) and then
it will focus upon the changes wrought by the enactment of Section 1-207 of
the UCC. This section may provide the creditor with the means for retaining the
the tendered check without foreclosing his right to sue for the balance of the
debt. 2 It is hoped that an inquiry into the legal status of debtors and creditors in
light of section 1-207 will prove useful to attorneys advising either party in
disputes similar to those presented in the above hypotheticals.

ACCORD AND SATISFACTION
When A, our debtor in the hypotheticals, tendered the conditioned check
he was performing two separate acts simultaneously. He was requesting a
substitution of a new agreement in place of his original obligation to pay for
five hundred bales of hay; and, at the same time, he was tendering performance
to fulfill that new agreement. This method of settling disputes is known as an
accord and satisfaction. The accord and satisfaction is composed of two elements:
the accord, an agreement to accept something other than that which is claimed to
be due; and the satisfaction, the fulfillment of that agreement.8
The accord is essentially a contractual arrangement and, consequently, to
be valid it must contain the proper subject matter, mutual assent, and consideration. 4 The requirements of mutual assent and consideration are of particular interest, as they are the subject of most of the litigation in the area of accord and
satisfaction. 5
The principle that mutual assent requires an actual meeting of the minds in
a subjective sense has been rejected in favor of the more objective test, which
states that there is mutual assent if a party acts in such a manner as to lead
the other reasonably to believe that he has assented.6 In the area of accord and
satisfaction, especially in check cases, the courts seem to have extended the7
objective test-finding assent even where the creditor's objection is manifest.
1.
2.
spective
3.
4.

6 A. Corbin, Contracts § 1279 (2d ed. 1962) ; see infra, notes 8, 9, and 10.
The section has not as yet been judicially construed and the doubt as to its proapplication is considered infra.
Corbin, supra note 1 at § 1276.
Eckert-Fair Construction Co. v. Capitol Steel & Iron Co., 178 F.2d 338 (5th Cir.

1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 928 (1950).

5. Barnes v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co., 192 Kan. 401, 388 P.2d 642 (1964); Kirby
v. Monroe Paper Products Co., 1 Mich. 680, 137 N.W.2d 736 (1965).
6. 6 S. Williston, Contracts § 1854 (3d ed. 1957); 1 A. Corbin, Contracts § 9 (2d ed.
1962); Hoeppner Construction Co. v. United States of America for use of Trautman &
Shreve, Inc., 273 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1960).
7. See infra notes 8, 9, and 10. But some jurisdictions require that in order for the
agreement to constitute a valid accord it must be entered into by the parties understandingly
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Thus, courts have found a valid accord and satisfaction when a check was
tendered in full payment and the creditor: (1) obliterated the "payment in
full" condition which the debtor had written on the check and then cashed it;8
(2) cashed the check but informed the debtor that he had accepted payment
only on the debtor's account and not in full satisfaction of the debt; 9 and, (3)
cashed the check but placed an endorsement thereon stating that all rights of
sue for the balance are reserved.' 0 These findings of mutual assent have the
common factor that a creditor appropriated the benefit of the other party's
performance, while at the same time he endeavored to escape the corresponding
obligation. The courts at common law stretched the objective test to find the
necessary requirement of mutual assent in order to uphold the accord.
Two principal forms of consideration support a finding of a valid accord. The
first is new consideration, such as payment before due" or a new security.' 2
The other type of consideration is found in the existence of a bona fide dispute
as to the amount of the debt.' 3 This form of consideration is based on the theory
that if the amount due is disputed or unliquidated the forbearance from suit
and the willingness to compromise is in itself valuable consideration.' 4 The
critical factor is whether or not the debt is undisputed, for if it is, part payment
on such a debt will not support an accord and satisfaction.' 5 However, to avoid
hardship and surprise, a minority of jurisdictions, including New York, provide
either by statute or decision that if there is a written receipt or agreement to
accept partial payment even a liquidated debt will be discharged. 16
At common law, the principle of accord and satisfaction prevented the
creditor in most cases from applying the check tendered in disregard of the
debtor's condition. Unless there was no consideration the creditor could reasonably expect that his cashing of the check would result in the finding of an
accord and satisfaction and the resultant loss of his right to sue for the balance. 7
Even if the creditor merely retained the check without cashing it he risked a
and with a unity of purpose. See, e.g., Kansas Power & Light Co. v. Hugoton Production
Co., 251 F.2d 946 (10th Cir. 1958).
8. Burgamy v. Davis, 313 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1958); Roberg v. Evyan,
Inc., 7 Misc. 2d 851, 163 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
9. Restatement of Contracts, § 420 (1932); Hudson v. Yonkers Fruit Co., 258 N.Y.
168, 179 N.E. 373 (1932); Motorola Communications & Electronics, Inc. v. South Georgia
Natural Gas Co., 104 Ga. 376, 121 S.E.2d 672 (1961).
10. United States v. Tapor-Ideal Dairy Co., 175 F. Supp. 678 (N.D. Ohio 1959)
aff'd, 283 F.2d 869 (6th Cir. 1960).
11. Crow v. Gore, 85 F.2d 291 (D.C. Cir. 1936); Bandman v. Finn, 185 N.Y. 508,
78 N.E. 175 (1906).
12. Dickenson v. Fletcher, 181 Ore. 316, 182 P.2d 371 (1947); laffray v. Davis, 124
N.Y. 164, 26 N.E. 351 (1891).
13. Merriman v. Thomas, 133 Me. 326, 177 A. 615 (1935); Burgamy v. Davis, 313
S.W.2d 365 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1958).
14. See supra note 12.
15. See supra note 12.
16. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 33, subd. 2 (1961); Real Property Law § 279, subd. 1
(1961); Annot. 119 A.L.R. 1126 (1939); 1 Am. Jur. 2d Accord and Satisfaction § 56 (1962),
n.14 and 15.
17. See supra note 1.
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finding that his retention was for an unreasonably long time and, therefore, that
it amounted to acceptance of the accord.' 8 The only alternatives open to the
creditor were notification to the debtor of his disagreement with the condition of
full payment, and either a return of, or an offer to return, the check.
The inability of creditors to use the payment and yet preserve their rights
and the creditors' limited alternatives were a consequence of the common law
doctrine that, "the manner of the tender of the payment shall be directed by
him that maketh the tender or payment and not by him that accepteth it."'"
Based upon this principle, the common law demanded that, when the debtor
tendered the payment on the condition of full satisfaction, the creditor either
20
accept it as extinguishing the debt or return the check.
THE UNiFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE
The Uniform Commercial Code contains a provision which appears to have
given additional rights to the party receiving a conditioned check. That section
provides:
A party who with explicit reservation of rights performs or promises
performance or assents to performance in a manner demanded or
offered by the other party does not thereby prejudice the rights
reserved. Such21words as 'without prejudice,' 'under protest' or the like
are sufficient.
A check tendered as conditional payment is within the scope of the Uniform
Commercial Code, and since it is commercial paper, Article Three of the UCC
is applicable. When a conditioned check is given as payment in a transaction of
a sale of goods Article Two is involved. Most importantly for present purposes,
however, Article One, which "sets forth principles and definitions of general ap22
plication," also determines the reciprocal rights of the parties.
THE CREDITOR UNDER THE UCC

The effect of section 1-207 where a creditor, upon recepit of a check
tendered as payment in full, attempts to reserve his rights, requires analysis. Since
there are no reported cases construing section 1-207, reliance must be placed on
the statute itself and upon the drafters' comments. Those comments, while not
legally binding upon the courts, have been highly persuasive in determining
the application of the UCC.P
In the hypothetical above, where A tendered to B a check to compromise
the dispute growing out of the amount properly owing on A's purchase of hay,
18. LePage v. Lalance & Grosjean Manufacturing Co., 98 App. Div. 179, 90 N.Y.S.
676 (1904); Miller v. Montgomery, 77 N.M. 766, 427 P.2d 275 (1967).
19. Pinnel's Case, 5 Coke 117 A, 77 Eng. Reprint 237, 1 Eng. Rul. Cas. 368 (1813).

20. Id.
21. Uniform Commercial Code § 1-207.
22. Hawkland, Uniform Commercial "Code" Methodology Vol. 1962 Ill. LF. 291, 300;
see also Uniform Commercial Code § 3-102 subd. 4.
23. Burchett v. Allied Concord Financial Corp., 74 N.M. 575, 396 P.2d 186 (1964).
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the result would be different under the Code than at common law. Assuming
consideration, B, at common law, must either accept the check tendered in full
satisfaction of the debt or return it.L 4 If he cashes the check, his later suit for
the balance of the debt will be barred by a valid accord and satisfaction. 25
However, under section 1-207, he need only state that he accepts the payment
tendered "under protest," or "without prejudice," thereby reserving his right to
sue later for the amount he believes is owed.
Hanna v. Perkins,2 6 the only case found mentioning section 1-207, lends
support to the thesis that the section will be applied to cases concerning accord
and satisfaction. In that case, the creditor indorsed and cashed a check presented
upon the condition of full payment. When the suit was brought for the balance
alleged to be due, the debtor moved for summary judgment on the grounds that
the suit was barred by a valid accord and satisfaction. The court denied the
debtor's motion because the question of the existence of consideration was a
triable issue of fact.2 Nevertheless, the court, in dicta, cited section 1-207 with
approval, stating that but for the issue of consideration it would have denied
defendant's motion because of the creditor's indorsement "under protest."' 8
Therefore, a creditor receiving a check conditioned on full payment and
desiring to retain his right to sue for the remainder of the debt should be counselled to write above his indorsement that he accepts "under protest" or "without prejudice." Section 1-207 states that these words will be sufficient to prevent
acceptance from prejudicing the rights reserved. The question of which rights are
reserved, however, is not adequately answered by the words "without prejudice"
or "under protest." It would seem advisable for a cautious attorney to instruct
the creditor to state he is reserving the right to sue for the balance of the debt.
The use of the means provided by section 1-207 seems to assure the creditor
that his later suit on the debt will not be barred by an accord and satisfaction.
But as this comment will later discuss, there are arguments for excluding section
1-207 from cases involving conditional checks.
THE DEBTOR UNDER THE UCC

In view of section 1-207, the debtor is unable to demand that his check
either be accepted as full payment or returned. UCC 1-207 seems to provide
the creditor with the means to reap the benefits of the tender while permitting
him to ignore the condition upon which the'check is submitted. It would appear
that the debtor must be counselled that unless he is willing to risk the application of the check to his account without completely discharging the debt he
should not tender a check conditioned on full payment.
Since section 1-207 has not been adequately construed by the courts, the
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

See supra note 19.
See supra note 1.
2 UCC Rep. Serv. 1044 (Co. Ct. N.Y. 1965).
Id. at 1046.
Id.
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above conclusions must be regarded as tentative. In view of this uncertainty the
debtor who, under prior law, used the conditioned check to his advantage may
still desire to risk its continued use. During this formative period arguments to
sustain the viability of the conditioned check can be made. In anticipation of
these arguments it is suggested that the conditional tender be phrased in the
following manner:
I, John Debtor, present this check to William Creditor in full
settlement of my existing debt to said creditor arising out of (specify
obligation). The creditor agrees to accept this check in full payment,
to forbear from future suit on the debt, and to refrain from seeking
to reserve his rights by accepting the check "under protest", or "without prejudice" or by similar reservation. 29 Consideration for the above
promises is my tender of this check to compromise a debt disputed in
good faith. 0 The check is not offered pursuant to, or along the lines
of, the original contract, but in recission and substitution of that contractual obligation and for an accord and satisfaction. 3 1 The return or
destruction of this check will evidence the creditor's rejection of this
shall be acceptance of this
tender, while the act of cashing the check
32
contract and its attendant conditions.
The above condition upon which the following arguments are based is
suggested as a means by which the creditor can be prevented from ignoring the
debtor's restrictions on the tendered check. While the condition is not basically
different from the old "in full payment" condition, it does provide certain advantages for the debtor. It expresses his intention fully and provides a court
which is friendly to his position with legs to support its decision. The debtor's
case proceeds directly from the stated condition instead of first having to
establish exactly what a condition like "in full payment" implies.
The issues involved in the application of section 1-207 have not as yet been
resolved in a reported case. The competing arguments below illustrate the type
of advocacy that might be presented to a court considering the effectiveness of
an expressed formula of conditional tender.
TEE STATUTE'S PURPOSE

Application of section 1-207 where the check is presented with the above
statement would not be consonant with the intent of the statute. The section's
purpose is to permit-not demand-performance along the lines of the contract.
To apply section 1-207 here is in effect to demand that any tender resembling
that due under the original contract be included within the scope of the statute.
Permitting the creditor to reserve his right to sue under section 1-207 would
not result in performance along the lines of the contract, but rather would allow
29.
30.
notes 11,
31.
32.

See infra note 38.
Obviates defense of failure of consideration requirement of consideration; see, supra
12, 13, 14, 15.
See infra arguments under statute's purpose.
See infra note 42.
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the creditor to divert a tender under a new contract to his own benefit while
disregarding the contractual conditions upon which it was presented. This outcome was certainly not intended by the statute.
An alternative argument may maintain that section 1-207 was not designed
to dispose of cases resembling our original accord and satisfaction hypothetical.
Assume that A orders one hundred bushels of apples from B but only ninetyeight are delivered. If A accepted the shipment with knowledge of the breach,
a court deciding under common law principles might consider his acceptance as
a waiver; and, if the UCC were applicable, section 2-607 might cause the buyer
to lose the right to revoke the acceptance. 33 The consequence of the risk of an
adverse effect upon the buyer was to encourage him to reject the non-conforming
goods. Since goods are usually most valuable when delivered to a buyer, this
reaction resulted in a loss of at least transportation costs and often a decrease
in value due to spoilage or obsolescence. In order to avoid the economic waste
and enable performance to be continued along the lines of the contract, despite
a pending dispute, the Code permits the buyer to accept the delivery and still
retain his rights. It is within this context that section 1-207 accomplishes its
purpose.
There is a critical difference between the above facts and the case where the
check is tendered pursuant to an accord. In the latter situation performance along
the lines of the contract has been consciously rejected and performance under
a new contract has been tendered. Thus, in order to be consistent with the
section's announced purpose, section 1-207's application should be confined to
instances wherein the parties intend performance along the lines of the original
contract and not expanded to include the case of an accord and satisfaction.
In rebuttal to the above argument it will be contended that UCC 1-207
was intended to control accord and satisfaction cases such as the one illustrated
in our original hypothetical. The section is inapplicable to the transaction
exemplified by the apple hypothetical because "the statute is not addressed to
the creation or loss of remedies in the ordinary course of performance. . ...34
Other sections of the Code (2-602 and 2-607) provide solutions to the problems
of acceptance arising in the ordinary course. Furthermore, even if section 1-207
applies to ordinary transactions in goods, such as the apple example, this does
not preclude its application in other cases. If the scope of the section were to be
so limited it would have been included within Article 2 rather than in the
generally applicable Article 1.
The section was intended "to provide a method of procedure where one
party is claiming as of right something which the other feels is unwarranted." 35
The fulfillment of this purpose is accomplished only by the application of section
33. Einot, Inc. v. Einot Sales Co., 154 Neb. 760, 49 N.W.2d 625 (1951), aff'd on re-

hearing 155 Neb. 323, 51 N.W.2d 791 (1952).
34. Uniform Commercial Code § 1-207 Comment (1962).
35. Id.
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1-207 to the accord and satisfaction situation. It is there that such a dispute
occurs and in that context that the section provides its intended remedies.
GOOD FAITH

It will be contended that cashing the check without the intent to honor the
condition upon which the check was presented does not fulfill the requirement
of good faith. The creditor's actual knowledge of the debtor's reliance upon
acceptance of the condition proves evidence that the former's disregard of the
condition is not good faith.
In many instances the debtor has been induced to tender the check solely
by his expectation that the creditor would abide by the condition. For example,
this problem appeared in our original hypothetical when A, who had ordered
five hundred bales of hay from B claimed that he was entitled to a reduction of
one hundred dollars for a shortage in the delivery. B, while admitting some
allowance should be granted, would permit only a fifty dollar deduction from
the purchase price. In reliance that the check would either be accepted in full
payment or returned, B presented a conditioned check for more than he believed
to be due: seventy five dollars less than the purchase price.
Good faith, as defined in section 1-201(19) as "honesty in fact," remains
a sufficiently flexible concept to permit a court to apply it to a case of subversion of the reasonable expectation and reliance of the other party.30 If the
underlying contract concerns a transaction in goods, the definition of good
faith, in the case of a merchant, is expanded to include "observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade."37 Assuming that the
evidence demonstrates a commercial practice of either acquiesence to the
provisions of a conditional tender or a return of the check, a court would have
even stronger grounds upon which to find a lack of good faith.
On the other hand, since the option of the creditor to reserve his rights
while assenting "to performance in a manner demanded or offered by the other
party" 38 has been consciously granted by legislative act, the argument that the
exercise of that privilege is not good faith is arguably unsound. For the court
to forbid the creditor to enjoy his statutorily conferred rights under the guise of
a finding of lack of good faith would be to substitute judicial judgment as to the
prudence of the legislation, rather than to apply or interpret it.
The contention based on the debtor's reasonable reliance and expectations is
also weak. The creditor may never have represented that he would honor the
condition of full payment, and UCC 1-207 stands as a warning to the debtor
that the creditor need not heed it. With regard to transactions to which Article 2
applies-requiring fair dealing and reasonable commercial practice-the same
36. Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 666, 669 (1963).
37. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-103 (1962).
38. Uniform Commercial Code § 1-207 (1962).
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argument is applicable. Moreover, even if the privilege exercised is inconsistent
with pre-Code commercial practice, this may be easily explained by the fact that
under prior law such a privilege did not exist.
VAlUATION By AGREEMENT

The agreement which arises upon the act of the cashing of the check contains provisions which in effect removes the privileges of the creditor granted
by section 1-207.39 The immediate problem which this result suggests is whether
or not such variation of the Code by agreement is permissible.
In civil law jurisdictions there is a clear line drawn between categories of
"jus dispositivum," a rule applicable unless otherwise agreed and "jus cogens"
a rule which cannot be set aside by contract. 40 Although the Code does not
borrow this vocabulary, it does divide the sections into similar categories. Some
of the provisions are explicitly placed in the class of "jus dispositivum" by the
inclusion of the phrase "unless otherwise agreed," 4' while others make it clear
that they may not be varied by agreement.42 Within these two extremes are the
majority of provisions, which do not declare into which category they fall. Most
of these are placed in the "jus dispositivum" class by UCC 1-102(3) which
states:
The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement,
except as otherwise provided in this Act and except that the obligations
of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this Act
may not be disclaimed by agreement but the parties may by agreement
determine the standards by which the performance of such obligations
is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable.
Since section 1-207 is silent as to whether it may be varied the above section
1-102 would apply, making variation by agreement permissible.
This argument is open to criticism because it rests on the premise that the
act of cashing the check is an acceptance, because if there has been no acceptance, no agreement arises; and thus the question of whether the Code can
be varied becomes academic. It is necessary for a court to be persuaded that a
contract exists before the argument of variation by agreement may be deemed
significant. Therefore the effectiveness of the argument rests on the proof of an
acceptance of the debtor's conditions.
Acceptance of the accord, based upon the act of cashing the check, will be
39. The condition explicitly removes the creditor's right to cash the check while reserving his rights by stating that he does so "under protest" or "without prejudice."
40. Bunn, Freedom of Contract Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 2 B.C. Ind. &
Com. L. Rev. 59, 62 (1961); see also, Lenhoff, Optional Terms (Js Dispositivum) and
Required Terms (Jus Cogens) in the Law of Contracts,45 Mich. L. Rev. 39 (1946).
41. See, e.g., 1-204(1), 2-210, 2-306(2), 2-307, 2-308, 2-310, 2-311(2), 2-312, 2-314,
2-315, 2-316, 2-319, 2-320, 2-321, 2-322, 2-323, 2-324, 2-325, 2-326, 2-327, 2-401, 2-503,
2-504, 2-507, 2-509, 2-511, 2-513, 2-514, 2-601, 2-615, 2-706(2), 2-719, 2-725(1), 3-414(2),

3-506, 3-802, 4-103(1), (2), 4-206, 5-106, 5-109, 5-110, 5-111, 5-113, 5-114(2), 7-204, 7-302,
7-309, 7-507, 8-208(2), 8-314, 8-316, 9-112, 9-204(3) (5), 9-206, 9-207, 9-316, 9-503, 9-504(2).

42. See 1-102(3), 1-105(2), 1-208, 2-302, 2-718, 2-719, 5-116(2), 9-318(4).
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argued by the debtor under several theories. The most obvious relies on the
statement contained in the tendering condition: "The return or destruction of
this check will evidence the creditor's rejection of this tender while the act of
cashing the check shall be acceptance of this contract and its attendant conditions." In order to establish an acceptance based on this declaration, the debtor
must prove that he had a right to declare that acceptance arises on the performance of the specified act of the creditor. It is well settled that the offeror
may prescribe the mode of acceptance, which may require either a performance
or a forbearance. 43 The offeror's right to prescribe the mode of acceptance is
limited by the principle that ambiguous conduct, which is not intended as
acceptance, will not be construed as such." For example, it has been held that
where a finder of a watch returns it, without the intention of accepting the
unilateral offer for reward, no contract arises. 45
The watch example, however, may be properly distinguished from the
factual context under consideration for the reason that in the watch situation
no injury is caused to the offeror. Where the offeror has been injured due to his
reasonable reliance on the conduct of the offeree, even otherwise ambiguous
conduct will be considered acceptance, and the resultant contract will be valid.40
Therefore, unlike the watch finder, where the debtor tenders a check and
specifies that the act of cashing constitutes acceptance; and the creditor, with
full knowledge of that condition cashes the check, the debtor is injured, and a
court may find that an acceptance has occurred.
Another theory which will support a finding that the act of cashing the
check is an acceptance is based on the following principle: "Where an act may
rightfully be done with certain consequences or effect, the actor cannot assert
47
for his own advantage to avoid that effect that the act was done wrongfully."
Thus, an offeree of goods at a price in excess of their market value cannot take
them and say he is converting the goods and consequently is not liable for the
contract price, but instead only for the market value at the time of the conversion. 48
In order to determine the applicability of this principle to our factual context, it must be determined whether the act of cashing the check and applying
it inconsistently with the condition upon which it was tendered is a conversion.
The Restatement of Torts defines conversion as the "intentional exercise of
dominion or control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the right
43. 1 A. Corbin, Contracts §§ 67, 77 (2d ed. 1962); Restatement of Contracts § 29
(1932); Shortridge v. Giho, 253 S.W.2d 838 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952); Union Interchange, Inc. v.
Allen, 140 Mont. 227, 370 P.2d 492 (1962).
44. Restatement of Contracts § 71 (1932).
45. 1 S. Williston, Contracts § 67 (3d ed. 1957) For similar results in cases involving
information leading to the arrest of criminals see, e.g., Taft v. Hyatt, 105 Kan. 35, 180 P.
213 (1919) ; Vittey v. Eley, 51 App. Div. 44, 64 N.Y.S. 397 (1900).
46. Rice v. Klamut, 81 Ohio 566, 91 N.E. 1137 (1910); 1 S. Williston, Contracts § 67A
(3d ed. 1962).
47. 6 S. Williston, Contracts § 1856 (rev. ed. 1938).
48. Id.
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of another to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the full
value of the chattel." 4 However, in most jurisdictions a chose in action may be
converted5 ° and case law,5 1 as well as the UCC itself,5 2 recognizes that a check
is a possible subject of conversion. Assuming that the check is a potential subject of a conversion, the critical factor becomes the characterization of the act
of cashing the check. In Craven v. Wright,53 the court found a conversion where
a check was given for a particular purpose but was diverted to another one,
and this seems to be exactly what has occurred in the instant factual situation.
The debtor has tendered the check for the sole purpose of having it constitute
full payment of the debt but it has been diverted merely to reduce the debtor's
balance. Therefore, since a check may be converted, and since an act inconsistent
with the purpose for which a check is presented may be an act of conversion,
a court may find that the creditor's cashing of the check was a tortious conversion.
Thus the principle which prohibits the tortfeasor's claim that he committed
the act wrongfully in order to escape the effect of the rightful performance,
would apply. The creditor's act of cashing the check would be given the same
effect as if it had been performed rightfully, with the result that acceptance will
be found to have occurred.
CONCLUSION

It would appear that a court could limit the effect of section 1-207 in
order to exclude its application from the factual context of accord and satisfaction discussed in this comment. This could be accomplished by any of the
following rationales: (1) the performance is not tendered along the lines of
the original contract and therefore the purpose of UCC 1-207 would not be
served by its application; (2) the cashing of the check and its application
inconsistently with the tendering condition lacks good faith; (3) the parties
explicitly by agreement have varied the creditor's rights in such a manner that
the privileges granted him under section 1-207 are not available.
When a court is deciding whether or not to use any of the above rationales
it should examine the relevant policy considerations. The public greatly benefits
from the private solution of disputes. If all controversies were brought to the
courts, the task of solving them would overburden the judicial apparatus.
Therefore, to the extent that the check tendered in full payment is an aid in
effecting compromise, its condition should be given effect. If courts deny aid in
enforcing agreements reached by the tendering of a conditioned check, that
49. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 222 A (1965).
50. See Rubin, Conversion of Choses in Action, 10 Ford L. Rev. 415 (1941); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 242 (1965).
51. Cases of check conversion: Lovel v. Hammond Co., 66 Conn. 500, 34 A. 511
(1895); Schmidt v. Garfield, Nat'l Bank, 64 Hun. 298, 19 N.Y.S. 252 (Sup. Ct. 1892); Graton
& Knight Mfg. Co. v. Redelsheimer, 28 Wash. 370, 68 P. 879 (1902).
52. Uniform Commercial Code § 3-112 (1962).
53. 114 Ore. 692, 236 P. 1043 (1925).
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means of producing settlements will rapidly disappear. On the other hand, the
tender of a conditioned check has been criticized as a weapon used by the
powerful debtor to overcome a weak creditor.54
Even the author criticizing the conditioned check, however, admits that
there is little danger of its improper use in most commercial transactions." It
is only within the class of cases where the debtor (insurance company, employer,
or landlord) is in such a superior bargaining position that he is able to
economically coerce the creditor into an unfair settlement. Unfortunately, this
problem would not be obviated by the elimination of the tendered check but
would require a more basic change in the law of accord and satisfaction, which
would prevent the debtor from using this means to force an inequitable settlement on the creditor. 56
There appears to be no substantial reason to permit the check tendered upon
full payment to be cashed without requiring that its condition be enforced. A
court may permit the condition to be effective by utilizing any of the rationales
submitted above. However, since section 1-207 has not yet been judicially construed we must await future court action to discover exactly what effect that
section will have upon the law of accord and satisfaction.

HoWARD T. REBEN
THE DOUBLE VETO IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL:
A NEW APPROACH
I.

INTRODUCTION

Article 27, paragraph 3, of the United Nations Charter provides that the
concurring votes of the five permanent members of the Security Council1 are
necessary in order to adopt a non-procedural matter. Therefore, if a permanent
member votes in the negative, it in effect vetoes the resolution. The determination
of whether a matter is procedural, and therefore not subject to the veto, is in
itself a non-procedural matter and therefore subject to the veto. If a permanent
member votes in the negative on this question, it establishes the non-procedural
character of the matter. Thus, by exercising its double veto power, a permanent
member of the Council can establish the non-procedural character of a matter
and subsequently prevent its passage.
While the double veto was invoked relatively frequently during the first
54. Role of the Check in Accord and Satisfaction: Weapon of the Overreaching
Debtor, 97 U. Pa. L. Rev. 99 (1949).
55. Id.
56. For example, the liberal application of the unconscionability concept, see Uniform
Commercial Code § 2-302 (1962).
1. Under Article 23 of the U.N. Charter, the Republic of China, France, the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
and the Unted States of America are permanent members of the Council.
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